Företags- och organisationsteorier är så allmänna att de inte är till någon större omedelbar nytta (Sandkull & Johansson, 2000)

25 October 2010

De företags- och organisationsteorier som presenteras i undervisningen har normativa anspråk men är så allmänna att de inte är till någon större omedelbar nytta. Kopplingen till de problem som sysselsätter folk i näringslivet är oftast mycket ytlig, något som dessvärre praktikens representanter mera sällan genomskådar. De mera djupgående och kritiska studier som ibland görs är alltför dåligt förankrade i näringslivet. De når sällan utanför de akademiska väggarna, fastän de skulle kunna bidraga till förnyelse av detta.

Företagsekonomi och industriell organisation ses allmänt som ett slags social ingenjörskonst som förmedlas till företagen genom konsulter och nyutexaminerade. Så länge den konkreta erfarenheten i företagen vägde tyngre än den formella utbildningen, ställde inte gapet mellan teori och praktik till några större problem. När de nyutexaminerade ingenjörerna och ekonomerna kom till företagen genomgick de en period av inskolning i den bank av erfarenheter som finns i varje etablerat företag.

Situationen har ändrats i och med att den formella utbildningen har fått större tyngd. Den omfattande datoriseringen i företagen har skapat nya möjligheter att förverkliga de teoretiska föreställningarna om företaget som en effektiv organisatorisk maskin, något som också datorsystemen utgår ifrån. Därigenom minskar antalet frihetsgrader i den dagliga hanteringen, och kopplingen mellan teori och tillämpning blir starkare. Praktikens sunda förnuft sätts på undantag, och konsekvenserna aven felaktig teori blir inte längre neutraliserade. Det är detta denna skrift handlar om, nämligen att teorin om företaget som en effektiv organisatorisk maskin i grunden är felaktig.

(Sandkull & Johansson, 2000, p. 7)


Problem setting (Schön, 1995)

24 October 2010

Increasingly we have become aware of the importance to actual practice of phenomena – complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value-conflict – which do not fit the model of Technical Rationality. Now, in the light of the Positivist origins of Technical Rationality, we can more readily see why these phenomena are so troublesome.

From the perspective of Technical Rationality, professional practice is a process of problem solving. Problems of choice or decision are solved through the selection, from available means, of the one best suited to established ends. But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which may be chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes no sense.

When professionals consider what road to build, for example, they deal usually with a complex and ill-defined situation in which geographic, topological, financial, economic, and political issues are all mixed up together. Once they have somehow decided what road to build and go on to consider how best to build it, they may have a problem they can solve by the application of available techniques; but when the road they have built leads unexpectedly to the destruction of a neighborhood, they may find themselves again in a situation of uncertainty.

It is this sort of situation that professionals are coming increasingly to see as central to their practice. They are coming to recognize that although problem setting is a necessary condition for technical problem solving, it is not itself a technical problem. When we set the problem, we select what we will treat as the “things” of the situation, we set the boundaries of our attention to it, and we impose upon it a coherence which allows us to say what is wrong and in what directions the situation needs to be changed. Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we frame the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them.

Even when a problem has been constructed, it may escape the categories of applied science because it presents itself as unique or unstable. In order to solve a problem by the application of existing theory or technique, a practitioner must be able to map those categories onto features of the practice situation. When a nutritionist finds a diet deficient in lysine, for example, dietary supplements known to contain lysine can be recommended. A physician who recognizes a case of measles can map it onto a system of techniques for diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis. But a unique case falls outside the categories of applied theory; an unstable situation slips out from under them. A physician cannot apply standard techniques to a case that is not in the books. And a nutritionist attempting a planned nutritional intervention in a rural Central American community may discover that the intervention fails because the situation has become something other than the one planned for.

Technical Rationality depends on agreement about ends. When ends are fixed and clear, then the decision to act can present itself as an instrumental problem. But when ends are confused and conflicting, there is as yet no “problem” to solve. A conflict of ends cannot be resolved by the use of techniques derived from applied research. It is rather through the nontechnical process of framing the problematic situation that we may organize and clarify both the ends to be achieved and the possible means of achieving them.

Similarly, when there are conflicting paradigms of professional practice, such as we find in the pluralism of psychiatry, social work, or town planning, there is no clearly established context for the use of technique. There is contention over multiple ways of framing the practice role, each of which entrains a distinctive approach to problem setting and solving. And when practitioners do resolve conflicting role frames, it is through a kind of inquiry which falls outside the model of Technical Rationality. Again, it is the work of naming· and framing that creates the conditions necessary to the exercise of technical expertise.

We can readily understand, therefore, not only why uncertainty, uniqueness, instability, and value conflict are so troublesome to the Positivist epistemology of practice, but also why practitioners bound by this epistemology find themselves caught in a dilemma. Their definition of rigorous professional knowledge excludes phenomena they have learned to see as central to their practice. And artistic ways of coping with these phenomena do not qualify for them as rigorous professional knowledge.

This dilemma of “rigor or relevance” arises more acutely in some areas of practice than in others. In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy lowland where situations are confusing “messes” incapable of technical solution. The difficulty is that the problems of the high ground, however great their technical interest, are often relatively unimportant to clients or to the larger society, while in the swamp are the problems of greatest human concern. […]

There are those who choose the swampy lowlands. They deliberately involve themselves in messy but crucially important problems and, when asked to describe their methods of inquiry, they speak of experience, trial and error, intuition, and muddling through.

Other professionals opt for the high ground. Hungry for technical rigor, devoted to an image of solid professional competence, or fearful of entering a world in which they feel they do not know what they are doing, they choose to confine themselves to a narrowly technical practice.

(Shön, 1995, p. 39ff)